GAFAM NewsEssay
Google, the antitrust punching bag: where its cases around the world stand
A country-by-country table of government antitrust cases against Google, the penalties at stake, and how it differs from Microsoft's IE case.
- First published in Japanese
- English edition
This week, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issued a cease-and-desist order against Google. The gist is that Google may have:
- offered Android smartphone OEMs contracts promising a share of ad revenue if they preinstalled Google Search and Chrome, and
- as a result, kept competing search engines out of the market.
“There’s so much news about Google being sued lately that I can’t keep track of it all…”
I hear that a lot. So I put together an overview, limited to antitrust cases led by government authorities.
Google’s antitrust cases (major examples only)
| Country/region | Google product | Main antitrust concern | Remedy or penalty (including ongoing) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Google Search | Excluding rivals through default contracts | Ruled illegal; remedies hearing in 2025, with a Search/Chrome breakup under discussion | *1 |
| Google Ad Manager, Google Ad Exchange | Tying its own ad server to its exchange | Ruled illegal; the DOJ proposes divesting AdX and DFP | *2 | |
| Google Play | App distribution and the 30% fee | $700 m (about ¥100 billion) settlement + alternative payments and sideloading | *3 | |
| EU | Google Search, Google Shopping | Favoring its own services in search results | €2.42 bn (about ¥400 billion) fine; changes to the display algorithm | *4 |
| Android | Mandatory preinstallation | €4.125 bn (about ¥670 billion) fine; search engine choice screen | *5 | |
| Google Ad Manager, Google Ad Exchange | AdX / DFP self-preferencing | Statement of Objections (SO) indicates that only divestiture would be an effective remedy | *6 | |
| UK | Google Ad Manager, Google Ad Exchange | Abuse of a dominant position in the ad stack | Provisional finding; measures including separation under consideration | *7 |
| Google Search | Investigation into whether search services have “strategic market status” | If designated, possible permanent conduct requirements | *8 | |
| India | Android | Forcing Google apps on devices | ₹1,337.8 crore fine (about ¥22.1 billion); users must be allowed to uninstall, etc. | *9 |
| Google Play | Forcing its own billing system | ₹216.7 crore fine (about ¥3.6 billion); third-party payments made mandatory | *10 | |
| Indonesia | Google Play | Forcing its own billing system | Rp 202 billion (about ¥1.8 billion) fine | *11 |
| South Korea | Android | Contracts banning modified versions of the OS | ₩207.4 billion fine; order to scrap the AFA (Anti-Fragmentation Agreement) | *12 |
| Japan | Android | Search and Chrome revenue-sharing contracts | Cease-and-desist order; contract revisions + reporting for 5 years | *13 |
(Yen equivalents of the fines were calculated at the exchange rate as of April 17, 2025, and roughly rounded.)
Four core products on trial
Google is suspected of antitrust violations mainly in four product categories.
- Search (Google Search): In a market Google is said to almost monopolize, do its paid default deals shut out competitors?
- Ad tech (Google Ad Manager / Google Ad Exchange): By vertically integrating its ad server and its exchange, does Google steer bidding to favor itself?
- Mobile OS (Android): Do preinstallation requirements and contracts banning modified versions lock out other companies’ services and derivative operating systems?
- App store (Google Play): Does Google exclude outside payment systems or obstruct rival stores to protect its 30% commission model?
The “quality” and “quantity” of the penalties
These are the kinds of penalties being considered for the violations.
Fines: The largest so far is in the EU’s Android case, at about ¥670 billion (roughly $4.7 billion). Then again, measured against Google’s annual net income (over ¥14 trillion, roughly $97 billion, in 2024), that may not be much of a wound.
Conduct remedies: Forcing Google to allow outside payment systems, banning preinstallation deals, and so on. These hit profit margins directly, so their financial impact looks far from small.
Breakup: Both the US DOJ and the European Commission have explicitly put the sale of “Search / Chrome” and “Ad Manager / Ad Exchange” on the table as options. Whether it will actually happen is still uncertain, but for Google this is likely the penalty with the biggest impact, and the one it most wants to avoid.
Brand reputation: This isn’t written down anywhere as a penalty. But Google does business with both consumers and companies, so it can’t ignore the fact that every time it is officially named as having acted “illegally,” corporate deals and advertisers’ risk requirements get stricter.
How is this different from the famous Microsoft case?
When people think of a big American tech company breaking antitrust law, many probably recall the case over Microsoft’s browser, Internet Explorer (IE).
Here is a summary of how the two cases differ.
| 1998–2004 Microsoft IE | 2022–25 Google | |
|---|---|---|
| Markets at issue | Bundling the PC OS with a browser | A multi-front battle across search, ads, mobile OS and app stores |
| Initial remedy proposed | Splitting Windows into an OS company and an applications company (overturned on appeal) | Breaking up Search/Chrome and ad tech, still under debate |
| Measures actually taken | Conduct remedies + browser choice screen (EU fine of €1.68 billion) | Conduct remedies, plus some authorities stating outright that a breakup is the only effective remedy |
| Regulatory coordination | Mainly the US → later the EU | The US, EU, UK, India, Japan and others, all in parallel |
Microsoft managed to avoid a breakup. But some experts think a breakup scenario is more realistic now than it was then, because Google holds dominant power in multiple markets, and because regulators have stricter tools than they did back then (the EU’s DMA, the UK’s DMCC Act and so on).
What to watch next
[2025: the US remedies phase comes to a head] In both the search and ad tech cases, the district court will decide between a breakup and conduct remedies.
[2025–26: the EU ad tech case is expected to be settled] If EU authorities make a final ruling that nothing short of divestiture will work, pressure for a breakup could spread to the US, the UK and other regions in tandem.
[Google Play: introducing outside payments and redesigning revenue sharing] Outside payment systems are already starting to roll out in places such as South Korea and India. Changes to commission rates and revenue models will need checking as they come.
[Android: search engine choice screens and a rethink of preinstallation contracts] Some regions have already implemented a “search choice screen.” If preinstallation terms are loosened, the effects could ripple out to device prices and OEMs’ revenue structures.
[Even if a breakup is ordered, it would take years to carry out] Google is expected to appeal and then seek a stay of enforcement, and an actual spin-off is predicted to be at least 3–4 years away.
Generative AI is already shaking the foundations of the search business. Add regulators around the world on top of that, and what makes Google “Google” may change dramatically.
…A scenario that goes beyond the fines game, to “breaking up a digital giant.” Nothing has been decided yet, but as a nocturnal owl, I plan to keep watching without missing even the smallest flutter of wings in the market. 🦉
Sources
*1 https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-judge-rules-google-broke-antitrust-law-search-case-2024-08-05/
*4 https://www.reuters.com/technology/eu-court-upholds-googles-27-bln-eu-antitrust-fine-2024-09-10/
*6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3503
*8 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-to-investigate-googles-search-services
*9 https://www.cci.gov.in/antitrust/press-release/details/261/0
*10 https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1870819
*12 https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2025/April/250415.html